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For interpretivist theories of law it is the value of legality that informs what counts 
as true legal propositions. The leading theory of legality in the interpretivist school is 
Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Law as Integrity’. This paper suggests that Dworkin’s view fails 
to account for several features of modern legal practices, particularly those that deal 
with international and comparative legal standards. It also highlights some 
inconsistencies in law as integrity as a conception of the value of legality and suggests 
an alternative conception to correct for them.  The result of this conception of legality 
provides the major thesis of this paper. This is that under an interpretivist theory, 
true propositions of law never conflict with what morality demands. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
  
In this paper my thesis is that, under the legal-philosophical school of 
interpretivism, true propositions of law never conflict with what morality 
demands. Under interpretivism one understands law as a social 
phenomenon by engaging in interpretation, which is a type of reflective 
reasoning. Broken down into stages, the interpretive method is as follows: 
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EXPANDING LAW’S EMPIRE: 
INTERPRETIVISM, MORALITY AND THE VALUE OF LEGALITY 




(i) The social phenomenon ‘law’ is capable of pre-interpretive 
identification. Before interpretation, however, we know nothing 
about it other than it exists and where to look in order to begin an 
investigation about it.[1] 
(ii) When we begin looking we will discover that certain legal 
practices (activities, attitudes or propositions that we can justify as 
‘legal’) will be considered paradigms. These paradigms form the 
starting point of interpretation.[2] 
(iii) One interprets these paradigms as a complete doctrine, 
producing a theory of ‘legality’ or ‘the point of law’.[3] 
(iv) This theory allows one to reach conclusions about the content of 
other laws that expand (or otherwise alter) the list of paradigms (the 
‘post-interpretive stage’).[4] 
(v) This, in turn, allows one to modify one’s theory of law (by 
returning to stage three).[5] 
  
As a result of this process the concept of law continually evolves 
over time, giving rise to a richer theory of the original social 
practice.[6] I criticise Dworkin’s approach to the second and third stages 
in my fifth section but take the overall methodology to be correct 
throughout. 
  
My argument proceeds in four stages. In the first section of this paper I 
briefly address the question of moral objectivity as a preliminary issue. The 
importance placed on purpose and value by interpretivism means that it 
depends on moral truth and the character of normal moral argument. My 
defence of both therefore serves as the first half of a methodological 
introduction as well. In my second section I place my discussion of legality 
in context by outlining the interpretivist position that legal reasoning 
involves moral reasoning and that moral principles form the ‘grounds’ of 
law. This is the thesis that true legal propositions depend on morality in 
some way. This forms the second half of my methodological introduction. 
  
In my third, fourth and fifth sections I discuss the dominant interpretivist 
theory of legality, “law as integrity”, which proposes one theory of this 
relationship. Given that a large part of this essay is devoted to 
understanding integrity, defining it at this stage is a difficult task. 
Putatively, law as integrity could be defined as making the best moral sense 
of the legal practices of a particular community by attributing coherent 
conceptions of justice and fairness to them. 
  
My third section discusses the relationship between integrity and equality 
of respect and the fourth evaluates law as integrity’s emphasis on 
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community. In my fifth section I discuss the adjudicative principle of 
integrity and conclude that legality is better understood as a union of 
moral accuracy and equality of respect. This amended theory of legality 
facilitates my ultimate conclusion because it relies on universal moral 
principles rather than those of a particular community. This allows me to 
conclude that what is valuable about legality is ultimately getting the 
correct moral answer in everyday political and legal decisions. To use 
Dworkin’s terminology, this is both the ‘jurisprudential’ and ‘doctrinal’ 
part of my argument.[7] 
 
Understanding the value of legality is essential for an interpretivist because 
a theory of legality is a theory of what makes a statement ‘legal’ or, in other 
words, what makes a proposition of law true. In the sixth section of this 
paper I explain more fully what the implications of adopting my theory of 
legality are. Because ‘the point’ of law is to produce correct moral answers 
to political and inter-personal problems in the real world, I conclude that 
any true proposition of law must conform to this standard. In other words, 
true propositions of law must conform to what morality demands given the 
same set of facts. 
 
II. A PRELIMINARY ISSUE: MORAL OBJECTIVITY FROM MORAL      
ARGUMENT 
  
Whether moral truth can be discovered by normal moral argument is 
highly contested.  In order to engage in an analysis of interpretivism I 
first need to establish the case for the soundness of moral reasoning, upon 
which it depends. The metaphysical and epistemological soundness of 
moral argument have been frequently challenged. These challenges fall into 
three broad categories.  Firstly, how do we prove that moral principles 
actually exist? Secondly, if they do exist, how can we become aware of 
them? Thirdly, does moral disagreement pose a problem for claims of 
moral objectivity?[8] 
  
The first challenge, of whether moral principles ‘exist’, is a difficult one to 
discern. When dealing with practical morality we scarcely rest our 
convictions on the basis that there are physical ‘things’ ‘out there’ that 
somehow causally govern what is moral. I certainly do not argue for this 
view.  Even if we do believe this, it is hard to see what it adds, as there is 
no way of examining the effects of this ‘moral field’ other than by engaging 
in moral argument in the normal way. However, much skepticism about 
moral right answers is based on the assumption that unless there is a 
moral field, there is no basis upon which to found moral truth.[9] This 
rests on a general epistemological assumption: a belief is only true if the 
thing that it is held about causes it to be held. This may work in the 
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natural sciences. I believe that water boils at one hundred degrees 
centigrade because water boiling at one hundred degrees centigrade causes 
me to.  This clearly is not the case for a moral belief; there is no 
perceivable quality of ‘wrongness’ that jumps out of the act of murder for 
example.  However, we have no reason to rule out moral objectivity on 
the basis that we cannot discover a causal relationship of this kind. For one 
thing this general epistemological position fails its own test.[10] There is 
no perceptible cause of the belief that beliefs are only true if the thing that 
they are held about caused them to be held. 
  
It seems to me that the project of seeking to found moral principles in 
some non-moral metaphysics is a misconceived one. It is relatively 
common ground in philosophy that no statement about what is infers 
anything about what should be.[11] Morality is the domain of what should 
be. As a result, any statement about what should be must be a statement of 
morality itself.[12] The only meaningful question that one can ask about 
moral principles is therefore whether they should, morally speaking, be 
taken to exist. To ask anything else is to assume that bare facts can answer 
moral questions. Any assertion that correct moral answers are impossible 
because moral principles do not exist must therefore be taken to be a 
moral assertion. Such theories therefore self-destruct. 
  
Some philosophers argue that theories of this sort are in fact 
statements about morality rather than of morality. This, it is claimed, 
protects metaphysical refutations of morality from self-destruction. 
Dworkin argues, quite rightly in my opinion, that this cannot be 
true.  He uses the following example of a four way disagreement, which 
I adapt slightly to fit better this particular limb of the argument: 
  
“A: Abortion is morally wicked: we always in all circumstances have 
a categorical reason – a reason that does not depend on what anyone 
wants or thinks – to prevent and condemn it. 
B: On the contrary. In some circumstances abortion is morally 
required. Single teenage mothers with no resources have a 
categorical reason to abort. 
C: You are both wrong. Abortion is never either morally required or 
morally forbidden. No one has a categorical reason either way. It is 
always permissible and never mandatory, like cutting your 
fingernails. 
D: You are all three wrong. Abortion is never either morally 
forbidden or morally required or morally permissible [because 
moral principles do not exist].”[13] 
  
It is clear that A-C are posing moral opinions but what about D? One 
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point can be made relatively quickly. D is clearly forwarding 
a conclusion that falls within the moral domain. D is expressing an 
opinion about whatshould be. She is essentially saying that if moral 
principles are not ‘out there’, everything is permitted. Justifying 
permissibility by claiming the absence of ‘a moral reason’ nevertheless rests 
on a reason of some sort. It seems appropriate to ask, given the principle 
that no bare fact can necessitate a moral conclusion, what sort of reason 
could this be?  Let us consider an analogous conversation, this time 
between lawyers rather than moral philosophers: 
  
A: This contract is void because there is no consideration. 
B: This contract is not void because there is consideration. 
C: This contract is not void because consideration is not part of the 
English law of contract. 
D: This contract is neither void nor is it not void because there is no 
English law of contract. 
  
Clearly persons A-C are adopting legal positions. Person D is also doing 
this. Although they seek to express their view of the contract as ‘neither 
void nor…not void’, the fact still remains that they think it non-binding. 
This is because the implication of there being no English law of contract is 
that no contracts in England can bind. The assumption that rests behind 
this is that only a law of contract could justify English contracts being of 
binding force. Theories such as this are substantive legal positions. 
  
Returning to the moral disagreement considered by Dworkin, it becomes 
clear by analogy that position D is a moral position in that argument. To 
adopt a normative conclusion within the moral domain on the basis of a 
justifying reason is to forward a moral argument. The moral element of 
that reason here is that in arguing against moral truth, D is forwarding an 
argument that in order to adopt a valid moral position, moral truth must 
be possible. This is a particular example of a very common moral 
argument; that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. There is nothing purely factual about 
such arguments; they cannot be considered ‘non-moral’. When one 
justifies a conclusion about what ought to be the case with a reason that 
purports to uphold that claim, one is making a moral argument. Once we 
accept the impossibility of making statements about morality that are 
not moral statements in themselves, it is clear that this sort of scepticism 
cannot escape self-destruction. 
  
A further argument follows from this. If all forms of moral scepticism are 
themselves moral arguments then it follows that they are arguments for 
the proposition that it is morally good that there are no objective moral 
answers. Putting aside the self-contradiction in this statement, it seems 
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highly unlikely that the best available moral interpretation of morality is 
one in which answers cannot be reached. Therefore a powerful moral 
argument exists in favour of the moral objectivity I argue for in this 
section. It is morally good that a method of investigation exists that 
allows us to discover moral truth. 
  
The second challenge is by far the more interesting. On the fairly safe 
assumption that morally correct answers can exist, we have to ask how we 
may reach those answers. The response to this epistemological question is 
implied in my analysis of the metaphysical objection I have just addressed. 
One proves that one has reached the correct moral answer through 
adducing an argument as to why that is the case. If I want to justify my 
views on same sex marriage for example, I provide a case for a particular 
application of certain moral principles. If these principles are themselves 
questioned, I must justify why I believe they are sound in themselves. If I 
can defeat any possible objection that may be raised with reasons that I 
honestly believe in, rather than obfuscating rhetoric, I have defended my 
claim and proved that my beliefs about same sex marriage are sound, or if 
you prefer, that they are ‘true’. 
  
Those who wanted some logically complex ‘box-ticking’ or criterial answer 
to this epistemological question will no doubt be disappointed. Yet it is 
difficult to see why they should be so. Outside the realm of pure 
mathematics and formal logic, we require no such stringent proof of the 
truth of our assertions. In the natural sciences I assert the truth that water 
boils at one hundred degrees centigrade by presenting evidence of that 
fact. If there suddenly emerges new evidence that water does not boil at 
that temperature, but rather at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit, then my 
conclusion is sensibly taken to be false. It seems to me that the principle 
that a conclusion is only sound in the natural sciences when supported by 
irrefutable evidence is not so different from the moral principle that a 
conclusion is only true when supported by an irrefutable argument. Both 
questions require a type of investigative process uniquely suited to 
pursuing truth within the field that they are raised. 
  
It is admittedly true that an epistemology of morals rests on the conviction 
that sound argument is the appropriate method of determining moral 
truth.  However, an epistemology of natural science likewise relies on 
the conviction that sensory perception of the natural world forms an 
effective basis for claiming truth about that world. The strength these 
convictions share is that they are integrated into the domains in which 
they are made. It is empirically supported that sensory perception of 
external events forms a sufficient basis for claims of truth about the 
natural world, through the understanding of phenomena such as light and 
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neurological activity. Likewise, it is a sound moral argument that sound 
argument forms sufficient grounds to believe a conviction to be true. Both 
these epistemological theories are theories about truth in the domains to 
which they pertain, but they are also theories of those domains. This is a 
type of circularity of course, but a circularity that is more indicative of 
soundness by virtue of its all encompassing consistency, than of fallacy. 
  
Next we need to consider whether disagreement poses a theoretical bar to 
this epistemology. The assertion goes something like this: we might accept 
that irrefutable arguments render a moral position true, but doesn’t moral 
disagreement indicate that this is never in fact possible? Before answering 
this question we need to make two distinctions. The first is between good 
faith and bad faith disagreements. The second is between uncertainty over 
an issue and the indeterminacy of that issue. 
  
In the event that the disagreement is in bad faith, it should come as no 
surprise that moral objectivity is not threatened. I can argue fiercely that 
abortion is categorically wrong even if I believe it to be permissible. All I 
am doing is producing words, much the same as a scientist who swears that 
water boils at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit despite evidence to the 
contrary. In much the same way we can discount all those moral opinions 
that are manifestly stupid, unthinkingly held, or self-contradictory. 
  
Firstly if a moral opinion is deeply counter intuitive and seemingly 
baseless, such as the belief that human suffering is morally irrelevant, then 
the mere fact that it is posed offers no threat to objectivity in morals. One 
might as well claim that science is under serious epistemological threat 
from creationism. One of course needs some criterion for determining 
whether something is ridiculous in that way. The one that recommends 
itself immediately is asking whether a right minded person could be 
convinced of the proposition, even if it formed part of a consistent moral 
theory. In any event, such beliefs are uncommon to say the least and so do 
not go to the core of the disagreement challenge. 
  
A much more interesting type of bad faith moral opinion is that which is 
unthinkingly held. My father has the fervent belief that people with 
expensive tastes should not have those tastes supplemented under a 
morally correct system of distributed justice. This conclusion may well 
turn out to be correct upon examination. However, as a moral claim it is 
epistemologically worthless without critical examination of the reasons 
behind it.[14] In a recent discussion over dinner my father confessed to 
having failed to consider an analogy between those with parentally 
nurtured and inescapable expensive tastes and those with physical 
disabilities. [15] He refused to examine the soundness of the proposition 
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however on the basis of a gut reaction. This can scarcely claim to be an 
epistemologically thorough stab at moral truth. This is so because moral 
propositions are true only by virtue of the argument that supports them. 
Unlike a bare fact, which could be sensibly understood to be independent 
of a method designed to investigate it, a moral proposition is 
metaphysically intertwined with the argument that proves it. To put this in 
crudely metaphorical terms, the moral proposition is the argument that 
justifies it. In the domain of morality the line between epistemology and 
metaphysics is blurred, if indeed it exists at all.[16] 
  
This sort of bad faith argument also falls foul of the straightforward moral 
argument for moral objectivity I outlined above. If we abdicate our moral 
responsibility to pursue the truth by justifying our beliefs, then we can no 
longer attest to the positive metaphysical claim that accessible moral truth 
exists for good moral reasons. In this way the epistemological is linked 
again to the metaphysical. The existence of morals and our capacity to 
understand them form part of an inter-dependent web of conviction. 
  
This leads on to the final type of bad faith moral opinion: the self-
contradictory conviction. This can take two forms. The first is where a 
belief contradicts itself in a simple sense. An example of this is a rejection 
of human dignity. I cannot consistently maintain the proposition that my 
life is objectively important because it is mine, but that yours is not 
because it is not mine. In order to justify the objective importance of my 
life with any reason other than the mere fact of personal preference, which 
is a purely subjective reason, I will have to appeal to the valuable 
characteristics of my life. These include concepts such as autonomy, 
dignity and uniqueness. Once I have done this however, my failure to 
identify the same qualities in your life opens me to self-contradiction. 
  
The second type of self-contradiction is where a moral belief is internally 
consistent but is inconsistent with some other conviction that an 
individual purports to hold alongside it.[17] For example, I cannot 
consistently maintain that even if racism is biologically pre-determined it 
is still wrong and at the same time view homosexuality as wrong on the 
basis that it is ‘unnatural’.[18] This is because the premise of one 
argument rests on the priority the moral dignity of autonomous individuals 
holds over bare fact, which is exactly what the other argument opposes. 
  
Contradiction invalidates moral opinions for two reasons. Firstly it is 
indicative of bad faith belief in the second sense; it exposes a failure on 
behalf of the individual to examine their views. This abdication of moral 
responsibility constitutes an immoral (or at the very least amoral) approach 
to moral argument and therefore is a non-starter epistemologically 
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speaking. One cannot justify moral truth if one is not aiming to. Secondly, 
the contradiction alone demonstrates that the understanding of principle 
that such a moral opinion is based on is an incomplete understanding. If an 
account of principle contradicts itself, then it is illogical. To claim that ‘A 
therefore B’ and ‘A therefore not B’ renders one of those statements false 
by definition. This holds whether the contradiction is express or implied. I 
have given several examples of contradicting moral claims already, both of 
the ‘lower level’ (such as the egoism and homosexuality examples) and of 
the ‘higher level’ of the moral epistemological claim that ‘no moral 
opinions can be true (except that one)’. Both fall foul of the same logical 
principle and are invalid as a result. 
  
That covers bad faith disagreements. If disagreement on a particular issue 
still exists even after all these thresholds have been passed, we are faced 
with a situation where two individuals (or perhaps one individual within 
themselves) have reached an argumentative deadlock. There are two 
explanations of such a possibility. On the one hand the issue is uncertain; 
on the other it is indeterminate.[19] Uncertainty is relatively easy to 
understand. Anyone who takes moral problems seriously will have 
encountered uncertainty at some stage. We may be unsure, for example, 
whether euthanasia is justified as an assisted autonomous act, or morally 
forbidden as an act of murder. However, such uncertainty cannot be taken 
to disprove the epistemological soundness of moral argument. That would 
be analogous to arguing that uncertainty over the existence of Higgs Boson 
particles serves as a disproof of the investigative methods of 
physics.[20] Uncertainty alone cannot amount to a positive case against 
an investigative method that otherwise seems to fit a domain well. Indeed, 
if uncertainty never existed, there would be no need for investigation in 
the first place. 
  
Indeterminacy purports to be a somewhat more serious claim. If a moral 
issue is indeterminate then there is no answer one way or the other. One 
example raised by Joseph Raz is the ethical choice between a life dedicated 
to music and a life dedicated to the law.[21] It is a relatively popular view 
that these two lives cannot be compared in any meaningful way. This 
cannot, however, disprove moral objectivity. If a situation arises where no 
argument can be made to show why option A is better than option B, the 
moral answer is highly likely to be: ‘Do either A or B’. This is not a 
disproof of moral objectivity, rather it assumes it.[22] As a result a 
positive argument for moral indeterminacy must be made in each case. 
Such an argument will likely be very difficult to make in hard cases because 
they already suffer from uncertainty. Where there is genuine uncertainty, 
something that requires a positive moral argument cannot be merely 
assumed.[23] This therefore creates no problems for the account of moral 
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truth I have developed. 
 
III. SETTING OUT INTERPRETIVISM: MORAL REASONING AS PART
 OF LAW 
  
In this section I set out the interpretivist position on how one discovers 
the law of a particular legal system. I will present Dworkin’s argument that 
we need to identify the moral principles that justify our political practices 
rather than simply looking to agreed sources of law. I also set out the exact 
role principles hold in legal argument under interpretivism as an 
argumentative precursor to my discussion of legality. 
  
Dworkin famously argued that principles play an important role in legal 
argument. Firstly he presented doctrinal evidence, citing a number of cases 
in which we can observe principles being used.[24] Secondly he argued 
that such principles are logically distinct from rules on the basis that they 
have a dimension of ‘weight’ rather than requiring ‘all-or-nothing’ 
application.[25] By this he meant that a rule provides an answer for every 
situation in which it is engaged. For example, ‘in chess bishops must move 
along diagonals’ leaves no room for exceptions. One either does or does 
not apply it. Exceptions are included in the rule itself: a rule with 
exceptions is merely complex.[26] This is because what constitutes a rule 
is a matter of form. A rule is a rule if it sets out when it applies, how it 
applies and what the result of its application should be. The content of the 
rule is irrelevant to identifying it as a rule. Principles are different; their 
application is dependent on their substance.[27] A principle will only 
apply if it contains something of value, morally relevant to the particular 
problem being faced.[28] The result of this dependence on substance is 
that a principle does not direct action in the same way a rule does, but 
instead suggests a potential outcome based on the merit of its 
substance.[29] A good way to unpack this is to think of a principle, such 
as ‘people who do wrong should be told why’, as including a ‘but for’ clause. 
This might be written as: ‘people who do wrong should be told 
why; unless any other relevant moral considerations should prevent it’. 
The element of weight comes in when two principles interact. Imagine our 
example principle comes up against a competing principle, that of 
‘ignorance is bliss’. In deciding whether to tell my child that shaking the 
bag with his goldfish in is wrong because he will kill the goldfish, I have to 
‘weigh’ the respective merit of maintaining my child’s bliss against the 
value of his moral education. This is a question that can only be answered 
by considering what I find valuable about these principles and, as a result, 
what the outcome should be. There is nothing about the form or substance 
of these two principles that directs me one way or the other without such 
consideration. However, when I have made the decision we might be 
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tempted to phrase my conclusion in the form of a rule so that, if the same 
problem comes up again, I can quickly determine the solution.[30]It 
should come as no surprise to the discerning reader that this reasoning 
process is more or less identical to the moral reasoning method I defended 
in the previous section.[31] 
  
Dworkin suggested that we have to engage in principled argument in hard 
cases because only by considering what is valuable about the law can judges 
apply it to new sets of facts. In other words, when the rules ‘run out’ one 
must look to why those rules are there in the first place to determine how 
they should be extended. However, the truly innovative element of his 
argument was to say that this was not an act of law making, but rather one 
of application. We are applying the law, he says, when we draw moral 
conclusions based on the principles that justify the law. This means that 
‘the law’ is the underlying moral theory that justifies legal practices.[32] 
  
H.L.A. Hart disputes this analysis of principles in his famous Postscript. 
Hart’s contention was that a principle is merely a rule that has not had all 
its exceptions accounted for. In other words, when we rely on principles, 
we are merely applying unspecific rules.[33] He argues so in response to 
an inconsistency in Dworkin’s early work in which the latter argues that 
whilst rules are all-or-nothing, the rule in Riggs v Palmer was outweighed 
by the principle that no one should profit from their own 
wrongdoing.[34] The reason Hart saw inconsistency here was admittedly 
a failure of Dworkin’s, but a failure of expression rather than reason. What 
Dworkin should be taken as arguing is that the principle supporting the 
rule in Riggs, not the rule itself, was being weighed against the principle 
that no one should profit from their own wrongdoing. The statutory rule 
was an expression of that principle, which presupposed the superiority of 
its substance. The rule was not applied at all in Riggs because that 
assumption was false. Hart fails to answer this. He claims instead 
that some principles are identified by their pedigree rather than their 
worth.[35] This is of course an avoidance of, rather than an answer to, the 
interpretivist challenge. Furthermore, Hart fails to provide a reason for 
why pedigree matters in some cases but not others. If we are to require 
obedience to particular legal decisions based on their pedigree, we must 
provide a moral justification for the importance of pedigree. When it 
comes to deciding whether we depart from precedent or restrain ourselves, 
we must engage in this moral debate. This is exactly what interpretivism 
asks us to do in the first place: find out what is valuable about the law in 
order to make a judgement about what the law requires. We gain nothing 
by framing this question as whether adhering to the doctrine of precedent 
is good or bad, because asking whether the law requires us to adhere to it 
involves exactly the same questions. Since legal practice includes this sort 
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of argument all the time, why would we over-complicate things by 
considering such matters to be extra-legal? 
  
Responses to this have been few and far between. Joseph Raz has argued 
that principles are not included or excluded from the law but rather ‘non-
incorporated’.[36] The meaning behind this is puzzling. Clearly Raz 
cannot mean that there is some half-way point between inclusion and 
exclusion; ‘non-incorporation’ cannot be a third logical option. A principle 
is either part of the law or it is not. To argue otherwise would be to 
commit to a view whereby even the most obvious hypothetical conclusion 
about the easiest case would not be law, even if it was patently obvious 
that any judge would rule that way. If a legal principle explains legal 
paradigms and sits well with one’s legal theory then it is simply part of the 
law. If it does not, then it is not. Alternatively, Raz might be taken to 
claim, as Dworkin seems to think, that a judge can make decisions in 
accordance with the law but not about the law.[37] An example he uses is 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution which requires 
judges to make moral judgements about free speech without giving those 
judgements legal status.[38] I find this distinction unhelpful. Judges are 
part of a social system designed to regulate human behaviour. There is 
nothing qualitatively, in terms of a judgement’s normative force, to be 
distinguished by holding the moral elements to be non-legal. Perhaps Raz 
postulates that moral judgements of this kind do not have the same 
precedential value or do not command the same duty to obey. Given Raz’s 
normal justification thesis I find this difficult to believe: he is genuinely 
concerned with the moral substance of the law.[39] This seems to reduce 
his objection to one of terminology. He has decided what counts as ‘law’ 
before taking account of the intricacies of practice and applies this a 
priori taxonomy to it. This might be instrumentally useful, but this is not 
an essay about the instrumental value of legal positivism.[40] However, 
we can conclude that given that moral principles form a core part of our 
legal practices, such taxonomy cannot help us understand those practices, 
and merely serves as common terminology for discussing them. Perhaps 
this is a worthwhile pursuit, but it is not the one we are engaged in here. 
When examining interpretivism we are concerned with whether moral 
reasons are determinative in legal reasoning. 
  
We have seen that under interpretivism principles play a justificatory role 
in legal argument, telling us what is valuable about the law. We have also 
seen that they are part of the law, in that recourse to principles is 
necessary to answer difficult legal questions. We must now ask whether 
certain moral reasons have a monopoly on legal reasoning. If that is the 
case then legal systems can only be reasonably viewed as a truncated 
version of morality. What we are interested in is not whether there are 
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certain moral problems that the law will never deal with, as this is a factual, 
rather than conceptual question. What concerns us is whether certain 
moral reasons have such a monopoly on legal reasoning that they operate 
to exclude others that should be taken into account under normal moral 
reasoning. In order to do this I will examine the prevalent interpretivist 
theory of legality, law as integrity, in the sections that follow. 
  
IV. INTEGRITY AND EQUALITY OF CONCERN AND RESPECT 
  
Law as integrity is a value, rather than a truth conditional rule or 
positivistic test, and as a result can be the subject of reasonable 
disagreement. A very basic definition of political integrity is that it is the 
value of a community personified treating its members as being worthy of 
equal concern and respect through consistently applying its own 
conceptions of justice and fairness to them. In this section I will analyse 
“equality of concern and respect” (hereafter equality of respect) and 
examine the relationship between that value and the general principle of 
consistency developed above. This exercise will allow us to pinpoint what 
is valuable about integrity and make some conclusions about its alleged 
status as a value. This, in turn, will further our understanding of legality. 
  
Equality of respect can sensibly be seen as a moral value. It is the notion 
that people should treat each other as being of the same value as human 
beings without discriminating on the basis of irrelevant 
characteristics.[41] To use Dworkin’s example, whether the year in which 
someone was born was an odd or even number should have nothing to do 
with whether or not that person’s choices should be 
respected.[42] Respect itself is a complex concept that includes taking 
into account someone’s best interests, opinions and autonomy. It is rooted 
in reciprocity and requires one to treat another as one would wish to be 
treated in their position with their characteristics. A relationship based on 
mutual respect is not reciprocatory in the way an agreement to further 
mutual interests or benefit is. The parties do not do so out of desire for 
personal gain. Equality of respect is an altruistic value because it requires 
one to respect others because they deserve to be respected. Historically 
the value is deeply rooted in the Kantian notion of the ‘kingdom of 
ends’.[43] 
  
Equality of respect is formal only at the level of the respect afforded; it is a 
deeply substantive theory of equality at the applied level, requiring 
treatment to suit the individual needs of the object of respect. Dworkin’s 
argument that the disabled enjoy fewer personal resources as a result of 
their disability and that such inequality is worthy of compensation is an 
excellent example of this.[44] The equality arises from applying a 
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consistent network of correct moral values to all people so that they 
receive the treatment they deserve. 
  
Integrity flows directly from equality of respect in conjunction with 
interpretive methodology. Given the facts of a particular legal system, 
integrity requires a reading of those facts that best complies with equality 
of respect.[45] I will discuss the notion of ‘the facts of a particular legal 
system’ later but for now it serves to note that all the moral work of 
integrity is done by the separate value of equal respect. This has a 
particular manifestation in the requirement of consistency. Integrity’s 
insistence on interpreting the law consistently comes from the 
requirement that people should not have different principles applied to 
them, or the same principles applied differently, for arbitrary reasons. Of 
course, the upshot of this must be that if departing from past practice 
actually furthers equality of respect then integrity requires it.[46] To 
argue otherwise is argue on a basis other than equality of respect and 
thereby rob integrity of its basic moral force. The conclusion that 
consistency is important only because substantive moral reasons make it so 
adds a further dimension to its epistemological function and is of 
paramount importance for us. As Gerald Postema puts it, we might be 
‘morally required to follow immoral principles’.[47] I will examine this 
seeming dichotomy in my final section but it suffices to conclude at this 
stage that moral reasoning is engaged at all levels of this theory of legality. 
Furthermore, any argument against law as integrity’s moral justification 
must be an argument that shows true propositions of morality sometimes 
conflict with equality of respect. Given the deeply abstract and altruistic 
nature of this value, such an argument will be very difficult to make. 
  
Dworkin defines integrity as a distinct political value that ‘sits between’ 
fairness (defined as the correct method of organising a political system) 
and justice (defined as the correct outcomes of political 
decisions).[48] Stephen Guest disputes this clear separation by arguing 
that equality of respect is the foundational value of justice, fairness and 
integrity, which serves to tie all three together.[49] He claims that we can 
only understand justice in particular by appealing to the idea that we 
should afford equal respect to individuals.[50] Whether this is all that 
justice rests on, or whether notions like punishment play a role on a similar 
level of abstraction, doesn’t matter for our present discussion. Certainly it 
seems very difficult to conceive of a workable conception of justice that 
isn’t committed to some conception of equality of respect. This suggests 
that integrity itself is either indistinct from justice in all essentials or is 
merely a theory of applied justice and fairness.[51] This bodes well for the 
ultimate conclusion of this paper, as applied morality is still morality. 
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V. INTEGRITY AND COMMUNITY 
  
Integrity as I have discussed it so far has been reducible to a moral 
justification for consistency based on equality of respect. For Dworkin, 
however, an important aspect of integrity is its relation to the political 
community, which he takes to be the nation state. This is where law as 
integrity starts getting complex, because we move from talking about the 
values of equality, justice and fairness to talking about a particular 
community’s conceptions of them. Law as integrity argues that in 
discovering the content of the law one must look to the principles that 
best justify the particular practices of an actual community. These 
principles, when considered together, indicate a particular conception of 
justice and fairness held by that community personified.[52] Integrity 
demands a uniform application of that conception.[53] Dworkin argues 
that law as integrity so defined is the best justification going for political 
legitimacy.[54] In this section I consider what, if any, moral weight is 
generated by the fact that such principles belong to the community. This 
is important because if the fact that the principles we apply come from our 
community is determinative of their legal validity, my thesis would appear 
to be a non-starter. 
  
Dworkin describes a ‘true’ political community as generating political 
obligations in the same way that more familiar associative communities 
such as families or friendship groups do. These latter groups are held to 
producepro tanto moral obligations on the basis of being a member of that 
group rather than for reasons of consent or general duties of 
justice.[55] For Dworkin only ‘true’ communities create obligations of 
this kind and in order to be considered such they must first be ‘bare’ 
communities in some identifiable social sense.[56] The conditions for a 
‘true’ community are that the relationship is special in that it is 
distinguishable by its particular value from background 
duties, personal in that all members consider the obligations to bind 
individual members to each of their fellows and for an equal concern and 
respect to exist between the members. This is not a psychological state but a 
moral proposition; it doesn’t matter whether the members of the group 
feel like this but rather that they should.[57] Dworkin claims that such a 
community goes hand in hand with obligations to adhere to the principles 
of the community taken as a whole.[58] 
  
There are several things about this that are not clear. Firstly, as Leslie 
Green points out, Dworkin fails to provide a detailed definition of a ‘bare’ 
community.[59] This might seem a relatively trivial point to an 
interpretivist, who is concerned with theorising about our normal social 
practices. However, in the present instant to trivialise this point would be 
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a mistake. In Europe this is particularly so given the importance of 
regional legal systems such as the European Union and the Council of 
Europe’s treaty bodies. In the UK, for example, are principles derived 
from national legal practices, the practices of all of Europe and/or the 
practices of the Union? Should this be on economic issues alone or on 
fundamental rights as well? Furthermore in political communities that 
have more than one legal system due to federalism or devolution, should 
we be concerned with the principles of the whole or of its parts? The 
model of community Dworkin uses seems too simplistic to account for the 
inter-percolating systems that comprise modern legal practice. In addition, 
it is becoming increasingly popular in political philosophy to reject the 
moral relevance of the nation state.[60] Surely we should be making 
moral arguments about what should count as a community rather than 
relying on a ‘bare’ factual filter to shut us off from considering certain 
possibilities. 
  
The next issue is that there seems to be tension between the requirements 
that a community be considered ‘special’ and that its members must have 
equal concern and respect for members of that community.[61]Presumably 
a community’s members must have concern as a result of their special 
relationship in order to create any meaningful distinction between the 
community and the rest of the world. However, can any understanding of 
equality of respect be commensurate with such partiality? Isn’t the very 
core of equality of respect vested in universality and impartiality? This 
seems to lend support to Guest’s argument that the core of justice is 
equality of respect and that integrity seems to be justice diluted.[62] This 
in turn suggests that legality based on equality in that way should be a 
universal moral principle and should not take parochial conceptions of 
justice and fairness as the grounds of law. 
  
This criticism is all the more forceful in light of the importance of moral 
responsibility to moral truth.[63] It seems difficult to imagine a good 
faith moral justification of equality of respect that allows differentiation 
between persons based on their membership of a particular nation. How 
can I claim to respect people as valuable in themselves if this respect only 
extends to those who share my nationality? This seems to be a moral 
argument of bad faith in the ways I describe above. In any event, it seems 
more appropriate to ground moral justifications of partiality in some 
other ethical thesis, such as the importance of partiality in developing a 
human’s capacity to love deeply and emotionally engage. Of course, such a 
thesis sits very poorly with the anonymous nature of a political community. 
  
The final problem is that even if we take political communities to be 
associative in the way that Dworkin conceives of them, that would not give 
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rise to a general obligation to obey their commands. Leslie Green points 
out the initial difficulty Dworkin faces: the moral force of an association 
depends on the substance of the association itself, rather than the form, 
because association in abstract has no moral point or purpose like concrete 
associations such as family or friendship do.[64] It cannot be the case 
that any associative community so defined generates moral obligations. 
Dworkin concedes this in his reply, commenting that wicked communities 
can generate no such obligations.[65] That objection cannot take us far 
however because Dworkin’s definition of a ‘true’ community has a 
substantive moral element, that of equality of respect. As Stephen Perry 
notes, this value is the most plausible candidate for providing the intrinsic 
worth of a political community, a worth that would seem necessary to 
generate even prima facie moral obligations.[66] Nonetheless, given the 
tension between that concept and the necessary partiality of an 
association, we cannot use it to defend associative communities as 
obligation generating in themselves. This is because if the moral force of 
associative communities rests on a value that, properly understood, 
requires those outside the community to be treated the same way, then the 
community adds nothing of moral relevance. We have no moral reason to 
hold the moral views of our own community as worthy of more respect 
than those of other groups. As such we have no reason to base our legal 
system on those principles exclusively. 
  
Green then goes on to dispute Dworkin’s example of a community that is 
otherwise egalitarian but demands that daughters defer to the wishes of 
their fathers regarding marriage. In this example the requirement is itself 
unjust but nonetheless well meaning: it stems from an incorrect 
conception of equality of respect, rather than a failure to hold that 
value.[67] Dworkin accepts that this would be a case of injustice but still 
maintains that the community’s expectations generate moral 
force.[68] He concludes that though reasons of justice might require 
disobedience, the existence of a prima facie obligation is evidenced by 
the regret we would expect the daughter to feel for disobeying her father 
and the apology he could legitimately expect.[69] Green points out, 
rightly I think, that this is not evidence of a violated duty of obedience, 
but rather of a separate obligation to respect the father’s wishes or even to 
respect the community itself. [70] The crucial point is that it does not 
contribute to the normative force of the community’s decrees because it is 
overridden the instant a countervailing moral reason of any force is 
provided. It fails, in other words, to contribute to the overall project of 
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, which is to demonstrate the value of 
legality as the justification of domestic law’s coercive power. Dworkin 
acknowledges this in his reply, going so far as to say that integrity 
(understood as principled consistency alone) cannot justify a duty to obey 
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the law regardless of its content.[71] Associative communities can 
perhaps justify a moral duty to adopt certain attitudes, but not one of 
obedience. Only genuine moral authority can do that. Indeed attitudes just 
shy of obedience might be best understood as justified by the universal 
duty to respect all persons equally, which as we have seen cannot be tied to 
particular communities anyway. 
  
A final position remains to be considered. Does community produce some 
sort of non-moral normativity that justifies the binding of people to a 
partially moral code? Some philosophers, such as Korsgaard, have 
discussed what ‘founds’ normativity.[72] Certainly, on the model of moral 
truth that I have argued for, morality as a normative system needs no 
further foundation. Given that true moral beliefs are the arguments that 
support them, it would seem to be a tautology to speak of justifying 
morality; it is like speaking of the need to justify justification.[73] What 
one has to ask is whether any non-moral justification of normative 
propositions is possible. 
  
Jules Coleman suggests that we may have ‘content-independent moral 
reasons’ to obey the law.[74] I find this assertion highly bemusing. 
Coleman indicates that considerations such as fair play justify obedience to 
law regardless of content. This displays a fundamental misunderstanding of 
justification. Treating any old moral reason as justificatory on the basis 
that it has some applicability to a situation is not how justification works. 
When examining whether fair play justifies obedience to the law we must 
consider the countervailing moral effect of the legal proposition we are 
asked to obey. If we do not then we are guilty of bad faith by explicitly 
choosing not to assess principles that may be (and to make this an 
interesting problem in first place) probably are, contradictory to the 
position we adopt. As I showed in Section I, this has the paradoxical 
quality of being a morally irresponsible moral position. I doubt, however, 
that Coleman is committed to such a view. Indeed, he accepts that law can 
normatively ‘misfire’ by virtue of failing to deliver the proper moral ‘point 
of view’.[75] This strikes me merely as a somewhat over-complicated way 
of saying that normativity rests on moral justification. There seems to be 
no basis for non-moral normativity in an argument such as this. 
  
Korsgaard’s discussion of justifications for normativity highlights one 
interesting theory in the shape of the ‘volunteerism’ of philosophers such 
as Thomas Hobbes. This is the familiar claim that normativity can be 
grounded in the special authority held by a particular body or person over 
others.[76] Authority of this sort is gained through the capacity to 
enforce. Legal philosophy threw command theory out with the ark, but as 
a justification for normativity such theories purport to justify, rather than 
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describe, obedience. I can see no prospect of success here. Unless we are 
to reject the idea that no ‘is’ directly leads to an ‘ought’, an additional and 
plainly moralreason is required to tell us why such authority holds 
normative force. There is no non-moral normativity to be had here either. 
It seems best to abandon the search altogether. The need to justify any 
normative claim will invariably lead one back to morality at some stage and 
as we have seen, there are no good moral reasons going for the intrinsic 
force of community. 
  
If we are still convinced that legality is intrinsically tied up with 
community values then we are left in a tricky position. As we have seen so 
far, hard cases of law are solved by appealing to the moral principles that 
justify the law in order to discover what the answer should be. This, 
interpretivism dictates, is what applying ‘the law’ actually means. However, 
if we are to assume that our principles are generated by the community, 
and not by what morality actually demands, then there is nothing of moral 
value in our principles (because a community generates no serious moral 
weight) and our task becomes impossible.[77] Law as integrity shoots 
itself in the interpretivist foot. 
  
This situation arises because Dworkin claims two things that, on closer 
consideration, are actually inconsistent. Firstly he says that we can reach a 
sceptical conclusion that the law is of no value and that our project should 
be abandoned.[78] Secondly he says that we can still count integrity 
(defined as principled consistency) as sovereign over what the law is in an 
unjust but consistently principled system.[79] How can we interpret with 
principles, whose argumentative force is determined by their moral 
substance, when those principles are devoid of such substance? Stephen 
Guest suggests that we can do this by making an interpretation from the 
point of view of a judge who believes that these principles hold 
value.[80] He distinguishes, as Dworkin does, between the grounds (or 
truth conditions) and the (moral) force of law. It is supposedly possible 
under law as integrity to understand the law of an immoral legal system to 
be law whilst condemning it as unjustifiable, because our language is 
‘flexible’ enough to describe it as such.[81] This cannot be though, for 
interpretivism requires us to discover what the law is by enquiring into its 
moral force.[82] 
  
Dworkin accepts that we make correct moral judgements by developing a 
network of interconnected and mutually supportive values.[83] He is also 
committed to the view that we reach correct moral answers by adopting an 
attitude of moral responsibility and reflecting upon the soundness of the 
arguments for our conviction.[84] It is hard to see, given this 
methodology, how we would go about interpreting the practices of an 
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unjust system in such a way that we could consider its evil principles as 
grounds of law. How does one understand the principle of racial 
superiority when one engages in reflective reasoning and has to 
commensurate it with values such as moral responsibility? Could a Nazi 
judge actually make a consistent justification of legal practice if the 
principles he is applying are deeply irrational? This seems unlikely. In 
order to construct a coherent body of principles on this basis we would 
have to commit to some principles that were so blatantly absurd that they 
would fail to stand up to the most simple moral examination. A principle 
that cannot stand on its own merits can scarcely be held to justify legal 
practice, even if it is perfectly consistent with it. After all (and it bears 
repeating) it is the substance of the principle that gives it the role it has in 
legal interpretation. In the case of an evil legal system wouldn’t a more 
natural conclusion be that, because its legal practices were incapable of 
meaningful interpretation, it has no law at all? Wouldn’t it make more 
sense to conclude that it merely has coercive force being applied on an 
inconsistent, unexamined and unintelligible basis? 
  
How can we save integrity from this mess? I believe that we can do so by 
eliminating the element of community that distinguishes integrity from 
equality of respect. We can use commonly held views of what counts as 
equality of respect as a starting point, but would have to assess them as 
moral arguments, rather than considering them established canon. If we 
have a prevalent or traditional conception of this idea and country X has 
one that stands up to moral scrutiny better, we should prefer their 
conception when considering what our law demands.[85] This is very 
similar to Stephen Guest’s notion of law as justice.[86] If we make a 
general justification of our legal practices through the value of equality of 
respect directly, then we don’t need to struggle with the problem of 
obeying a particular community’s principles as definitive grounds of law. 
Instead we can argue for the use of genuine principles: that is, principles 
that stand up to normal moral scrutiny. Such an account of principles fits 
well with legal practices such as appealing to foreign precedents because it 
explains why we think substantively correct moral conclusions matter in 
hard cases.[87] As such, this theory has the benefit of explaining some 
common legal practices in addition to avoiding the problems engendered 
by attempting to argue, as Dworkin does, for the importance of moral 
reasoning on the one hand and community values on the other. Appealing 
to universal, as opposed to community based, moral principles affords us 
the luxury of not being tied to tradition when considering what conception 
of those principles makes sense.  Such freedom to speculate means that 
we can engage in moral reasoning in a far more responsible way. As lawyers 
we can proceed on the basis that we are applying principles we believe to 
be true, rather than those we don’t. 




Of course, this once again reduces integrity to a theory of which moral 
standards legal propositions have to satisfy. It is a theory of legal morality 
and cannot be used to dispute my thesis that true legal propositions never 
conflict with what morality requires under an interpretivist model. We are 
back where we were at the beginning of this section: if you want to dispute 
the morality of legality you have to dispute the morality of equal concern 
and respect. 
 
VI. INTEGRITY AND THE DIMENSION OF FIT 
  
In this section I turn from abstract discussions of the moral value of 
integrity to see whether this moral value in fact justifies legal practice (as a 
theory of legality must). I ask whether integrity explains our adherence to 
precedent and whether alternative explanations might suit that 
phenomenon better. I end this section by suggesting that law as integrity 
leaves out an important element of legal practice: that of moral progress. 
  
The adjudicative principle of integrity is famously composed of an element 
of fit (making sure that one’s theory in fact explains legal practices) and 
one of justification (ensuring that the theory explains what is valuable 
about the practices). These two elements are not separable but form part 
of a single interpretive exercise.[88] The element of fit is not one of 
mechanical consistency but rather one of interpretive consistency. This 
means that it doesn’t demand us to fit a judicial decision with past practice 
but to make a decision fit with the principles that justify past 
practice.[89] My discussion of integrity so far has highlighted the 
problems with viewing the (possibly unsound) principles of a particular 
community as the grounds of law. The adjudicative principle of integrity is 
designed to reflect this conclusion that I so hotly dispute. Nevertheless 
there is something intuitively appealing about it. We paradigmatically 
argue from the past political decisions of our own community rather than 
those of others. Indeed the whole system of arguing from authority, rather 
than on the basis of sound moral argument, suggests that our legal 
practices value something about such sources. A major task for my thesis is 
therefore to explain this practice in such a way that justifies my previous 
conclusion that it is morality, and not a moral reading of past practice 
alone, that gives legal propositions their truth. 
  
First I want to make a methodological point. The idea of ‘fit’ and 
‘justification’ is actually one common to all interpretive methodology and 
not unique to legal reasoning. Dworkin’s analogy of the chain novel 
demonstrates this.[90] In normal interpretive methodology one assumes 
there is a substance one ‘fits’ one’s interpretation to. Interestingly in all of 
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Dworkin’s examples this is a settled matter. In his chain novel example his 
authors fit their interpretation to the existing text. Hercules fits his legal 
interpretation to the collection of political decisions presented to him by 
his fictional variant of the American legal system.[91] The problem with 
this is that in real life there is no such thing as a fixed list of legal sources. 
In the UK we accept that among our legal sources are things such as 
statues and case law. However we also refer to academic commentary, 
international standards and comparative jurisprudence. The latter are 
taken to be non-binding of course, but this is only a feature of Anglo-
American legal systems. In Germany for example, courts often treat past 
decisions and academic commentary as equally persuasive.[92] In 
countries with a written constitution it would seem easier to locate the 
definitive list of legal sources that we may ‘fit’ our interpretation to. 
However legal practice almost always expands on such documents. The 
case of Marbury v Madison in the US is a key example of this.[93] The 
Supreme Court actually increased (or at least pointed out the logical extent 
of) the power of its own decisions through legal 
interpretation. Marbury is instructive because it illustrates that what we 
ultimately need to ‘fit’ as interpreters is not legal sources but rather legal 
practice. Legal practice is, unfortunately, not something that we can refer 
to in written format because it comprises more than official decisions. It 
includes methods of reasoning and substantive moral convictions. For 
example, in the UK Parliament is considered sovereign by many. Whilst 
we could provide a historical account of how this came to be, we would 
have no reason to accept this tradition as part of our legal practices, only 
an explanation of how we became aware of the possibility of counting it 
as such. We must hold a substantive moral conviction that 
Parliament should be sovereign in order to justify why we consider 
obedience to it as part of our legal practices. Even fidelity to a written 
constitution requires an underlying moral theory. If not, one could not 
proceed with moral-principle-based legal reasoning, as judges can so 
obviously be seen to be doing. Without independent justifications of their 
existence, legal practices cannot be interpreted. Legal interpretation 
requires the interpreter to identify the practices that count. Making the 
best sense of legal practice cannot be the same as interpreting a novel or a 
collection of official decisions. 
  
Note that I am not repeating the ‘Hercules is a myth’ objection.[94] For 
Dworkin, Hercules is an ideal that illustrates how a real judge should 
reason. My objection is that a real judge simply cannot reason this way. 
This is because in order to have a concept of fit one requires a positive 
moral theory of what should count as the sources of law one is 
interpreting. Ask yourself the following question: why do statutes count as 
sources of law? An American lawyer might respond by citing his nation’s 
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constitution. He faces exactly the same problem there though. Ultimately 
all that one can ever do is to provide a substantive moral reason why a 
particular source counts as an appropriate target of interpretation. Law as 
integrity fails to do this because it assumes that the question of what 
counts as legal practice is a settled matter. Take the example of 
international law and the creation of jus cogens norms. Traditional 
theories of international law suggest that it develops from different 
varieties of state action or consent.[95] We could adopt a Dworkinian 
approach to this and argue that the global community of states is what we 
draw our legal practice from and that the grounds of law are the principles 
that best justify that state practice. However state practice can 
purportedly create norms that then exist regardless of whether state 
practice conforms to them. Do we accept the application of these norms 
as part of our legal practice or do we reject them as inconsistent with our 
practices thus far? Whatever we decide, we will have to provide a reason 
for including or excluding them other than the fact that they exist. To use 
another example, official decisions of a political community include arrests 
made by the police. Do we count these as part of our legal practice and 
require a theory of legality to account for the reason why more young black 
males end up being arrested for the same offences than young white 
females? Of course we do not, for we have good moral reasons not to count 
these actions as part of our legal practices. So why do we place so much 
weight on the opinions of a judge writing one hundred years ago and not 
on a modern academic at the height of his powers? It seems difficult to 
answer this question other than by providing a moral answer.[96] Legality 
therefore requires moral justifications for every aspect of legal practice. If 
a legal practice has none, then there is no reason for considering it to be a 
worthy object of interpretation.[97] 
  
This conclusion has less of an impact upon our current legal practices than 
one might think.  As previously stated, we can already provide positive 
moral reasons for why statutes and case law ‘count’ and prosecution 
demographics do not. By forwarding the conclusion I have, I am not 
suggesting that all our present sources of law are invalid, merely that 
everything treated as a source of law must have a moral justification. Nine 
times out of ten leading cases provide a wholly justifiable moral basis for a 
legal decision. Every now and again however, such as in the case of R v R, 
authority should be and is overturned for moral reasons.[98] A theory of 
legality that places justification at the heart of ‘fit’ accounts very well for 
this. That a positive moral value can change our approach to interpretation 
should be no surprise, as a theory of interpretation is itself a moral theory. 
  
I can now move on to discuss the substance of the doctrinal stage of law as 
integrity. It provides us with a very good reason why we should accept 
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statutes as valid sources of law regardless of their content. Equality of 
respect, it is argued, requires us to respect the moral value of the moral 
beliefs of others even when they are wrong.[99] We can justify enforcing 
a statute in some circumstances if the result of doing so demonstrates a 
greater equality of respect than not doing so. The explanation is not as 
obvious for law as integrity’s treatment of judicial decisions. As Fred 
Schauer points out, “only when past wrong decisions can [allegedly] 
provide reasons for decision despite their wrongness, and therefore 
precisely because of their pastness”, do we cast about for some content-
independent moral weight.[100] Dworkin’s answer to this problem is that 
past judicial decisions create “embedded mistakes”, which if not 
propagated, would violate equality of respect by causing people’s 
expectations to be frustrated.[101] Such a mistake loses its “gravitational 
force” and cannot contribute to the interpretation of other propositions of 
law but retains its “specific authority” to govern its particular 
circumstances. Leaving aside the question of where to draw the line 
between a decision’s gravitational force and specific authority, it is morally 
questionable why one should enforce a wrong decision of a past judge 
when there is no democratic force behind it. To put the question another 
way, does equality of respect really require us to maintain embedded 
mistakes because respect implies satisfying a person’s expectations of 
authority? 
  
There is certainly a principle of legitimate expectations in public law that 
might be given as evidence for this.[102] However, it seems odd to justify 
a doctrinal error, no matter how deeply embedded, as worthy of being 
upheld on the basis of respect. Surely it would demonstrate greater respect 
to apply correct moral reasoning to an individual rather than bind them by 
morally inappropriate standards, even if these standards benefit them? 
After all, as I commented in my third section, equality of respect requires 
action appropriate to the object of respect and not necessarily the 
treatment such a person either expects or desires. Furthermore the 
adjudicative principle of integrity is concerned with “horizontal 
consistency…amongst the principles a community now enforces” 
(emphasis added).[103] To count the age of a precedent as relevant 
implies that maintaining a particular set of principles is in fact important, 
which might be counted as an internal inconsistency of law as integrity. 
  
Indeed, a drawn line between “principles now enforced” and ‘old’ 
principles needs must be blurred. If we take every new judicial decision in 
a hard case as altering the interpretation integrity requires, at least in part, 
then all attempts to justify precedent with equal treatment must fail. This 
is because every time a new decision is reached, and legal practice alters, 
the principles we adopt will alter in their application even if not 
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immediately in their substance. New legal possibilities will suggest 
themselves and a certain amount of follow-up litigation will result. Time 
passing is obviously important and just because change is incremental we 
should not be tempted to deny that it is change. 
  
If, on the other hand, we accept that the correct standards for determining 
true propositions of law are moral standards, rather than the best moral 
interpretations of a changing set of legal practices, we can re-establish 
Dworkin’s claim that judges reasoning morally are applying the law rather 
than changing it.[104] Since principles enforced by a community change 
over time and judicial decisions form a large part of the interpretive basis 
of such principles, it seems hard to avoid the charge that judges change the 
law if the grounds of law are the principles adopted by the community. If 
the principles used are true moral principles, rather than principles that 
depend for their weight in part on emanating from an associative 
community, then the judges really do apply, rather than make, the law. 
That is because what counts as a true moral principle is metaphysically 
restricted to those supported by an unassailable moral argument. When we 
appeal to moral principles in the normal way we seek to establish a case for 
all places at all times. If law is based on such a case then it 
cannot be changed, only progressively realised. 
  
Some might object at this stage that such a theory of legality sits very badly 
with the practice of precedent and that judges are hardly infallible when it 
comes to determining correct moral principles anyway. I fully accept the 
latter point and it is for that very reason that I reject the former. Given the 
problems law as integrity seems to encounter in explaining precedent I 
propose an alternative conception of legality. Dworkin comments in his 
discussion of legality that ‘accuracy’, the value of implementing the correct 
moral answer, was favoured by the ancient natural lawyers because it 
enables the law to instantiate God’s will.[105] I propose that accuracy is 
an important aspect of legality, and one that law as integrity neglects, 
because it instantiates, not God’s will, but correct moral reasoning. If we 
view precedent, not as a collection of definitive conclusions on matters of 
principle, but as an ongoing project of investigation into the nature of an 
ideal set of social relations, then we can develop a view of legality that 
promotes the importance of moral development. Since the early days of 
moral philosophy scholars have used moral arguments to enquire into the 
meaning of important concepts and to develop theories of virtue and state. 
It is widely accepted that we develop our moral theories best when many 
minds engage on important issues and understanding flourishes in 
academic debates when critics emerge and theories are put to the 
test.[106] Even more progress is made with ideas when philosophers 
apply them to new problems and seek coherence across broader ranges of 
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examples.[107] Precedent can be seen as fulfilling an analogous role. 
  
I am not suggesting that what counts as a true proposition of law changes 
as moral progress is made, but rather that getting the law right is aided by 
developing a corpus of discussion of various issues because that corpus 
itself aids moral investigation. Under such a model, precedent would only 
be worth following if it was morally correct but it would still be a valuable 
contribution to an ongoing project even if it were wrong. This model of 
the value of precedent accounts very easily for instances where established 
precedent is overturned. Any contentious decision that overturned 
established precedent, such as R v R in the UK or Brown v Board of 
Education of Topeka in the US, can be seen as justified because it got the 
law right not just in terms of consistency but in terms of 
content.[108] Adherence to past practice when in doubt also has the 
established merit of ensuring that fewer mistakes are made.[109] 
  
Such a theory of legality might be ‘forward looking’ in a sense, but should 
not be confused with theories such as legal pragmatism, which are forward 
looking because they require judges to consider what rules might be 
instrumentally useful for the future.[110] Instead this conception of 
legality is one that recognises law’s momentum as an evolving system of 
principles based on moral investigation. It always aims, however, to get 
matters of principle correct in the present. It is the past that is questioned 
– the future is not speculated about. 
  
Under a theory of legality that emphasises the importance of moral 
investigation, equality of respect could still be the fundamental value of a 
legal system. Indeed the two seem to sit very well together as both equality 
of respect and accuracy require in-depth moral justification of legal 
decisions in order to prove why the solution adopted justifies the way the 
parties are treated. Furthermore, the value of precedent would be 
maintained under such a conception of legality: judges would be pushed to 
emphasise why reaching a different decision in the present case was 
required. The emphasis would be on why a different solution was reached, 
rather than why a previous decision should be repeated. The result of this 
is that the equality of respect that law as integrity promotes, that of 
ensuring that consistent principles are applied to all, would be better 
served by adopting this less stringent adherence to precedent. For after all, 
how could we describe a person as being of integrity if they failed to 
question their own beliefs? Surely the consistency of integrity comes from 
reflective concern for others rather than dogmatism or arrogant belief in 
one’s moral perfection? Perhaps this ‘new’ theory of legality I am arguing 
for is in fact a variety of integrity itself. It doesn’t matter what I call it. 
The important point is that it describes the value of legality as one that 
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actively aims to transcend parochial conceptions of value rather than being 
held back by them. Accepting this theory of legality requires one to accept 
my overall thesis as well. This is because legality (for interpretivists) is what 
gives rise to the truth conditions of law and this theory of legality requires 
the best possible moral answer to any legal question. 
  
This theory of legality might seem counter-intuitive to some but only if 
one focuses on the legal practice of stare decisis alone. It is important to 
bear in mind that we are seeking a justification of legality that captures the 
value of all our legal practices taken together. I believe that this union of 
accuracy and equality best justifies legal practices such as judicial use of 
academic writings, comparative doctrine and international standards in 
formally dualist systems. It also helps explain the increased importance of 
dialogue between national and international courts, in addition to that 
between courts and legislatures.[111] These practices are easily 
understandable through a theory of progressive accuracy. Furthermore, 
whilst it might have serious implications for the nature of the value of past 
precedent, it could very easily leave the duty of lower courts to obey higher 
courts untouched. We might seek to justify the latter with arguments of 
efficiency, claiming that it would just be practically unworkable to have an 
appeal system without vertical precedent of this kind. After all, to a theory 
of legality that places emphasis upon accuracy, quality of reasoning is of 
paramount importance. If the courts have no time to reason at length 
because of flooded dockets then the whole legal project goes down the 
drain. Vertical precedent might be an entirely justifiable solution to this 
problem.[112] 
  
It should also be remembered that whilst the common law world agonizes 
over stare decisis, very many legal systems who also prize legality have no 
formal system of precedent and treat past cases as persuasive only. There is 
also no strict doctrine of precedent in international law and judicial 
decisions are only ‘subsidiary means’ of interpreting other sources under 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Incidentally, 
the same weight is given in that statute to academic opinion. Furthermore, 
in the UK, the Supreme Court has the power to override any of its 
previous decisions following the judgement of the House of Lords in the 
Practice Statement so as not to ‘unduly restrict the proper development of 
the law’. [113] The UK Court of Appeal also has the power to override 
its own decisions in criminal cases due to concern for individual justice. In 
civil cases whilst it is formally bound to its past interpretations of the law 
it can override its own previous decisions in the event of mistaken views 
about the existence of legal decisions or when there is a conflict in the 
doctrine.[114] A union of accuracy and equality explains this more flexible 
approach to precedent and reflects the current state of legal practice 
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better than law as integrity. 
 
VII. LAW: MORALITY IN CONTEXT 
  
In this section I expand upon the conclusion that, for interpretivists, true 
propositions of law depend upon what morality demands. I adopt an 
understanding of morality that reflects the both the theory of moral truth 
advocated above and the theory of legality that I have developed. This is 
that ‘what morality requires’ must be answers to specific questions given 
the context in which they are asked and not what those answers would be, 
were it not for that context. This is both because of the correct standards 
of moral reasoning described in Section I and because legal questions deal 
with real problems, not simple thought experiments. It is important, as a 
result, to root moral questions in the choices that people have to make. As 
Dworkin puts it in the context of the allocation of resources: 
  
“…we should begin in ethics…The mix of personal ambitions, attitudes, 
and preferences that I find in…the overall state of the world’s resources, is 
not in itself either fair or unfair to me; on the contrary,that mix is among the 
facts that fix what it is fair or unfair for me to do or to have.” (Emphasis 
added.)[115] 
  
It should be clear from my discussion of legality so far that I consider it to 
promote correct moral decisions of this nature. I argue that it does so 
through an equal commitment to both accuracy and equality of respect. 
Even if my previous criticisms of law as integrity are not convincing, I have 
at least demonstrated that morality underpins every aspect 
of that conception of legality.[116] As a result of legality requiring 
moral justification all the way down, legal propositions must be morally 
sound.[117] The interesting question is what legal reasoning based on 
moral soundness alone might look like. 
  
Practical moral judgements are highly contextual. It might be acceptable 
for the law to allow something to happen that might be considered wrong 
in isolation. The moral question addressed to a legal decision-maker is not 
whether the outcome contains only aspects that are right in themselves 
but whether the overall outcome is the best possible or not. This is exactly 
the same as the moral question that we would ask in the same 
circumstances. The only difference is that the legal question is asked as 
part of our legal practices. 
  
One example of this might be judicial review of a hypothetical American 
income tax statute.[118] Raising income tax to 99% would be immoral 
and as a result unlawful under the theory of legality I have proposed. It 
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would have crippling effects on individual economic autonomy and would 
frustrate the ‘Blessings of Liberty’ that should be protected for each 
individual as well as arguably being against ‘the general welfare of the 
United States’.[119] Such an argument would rest on a theory of liberty 
that included economic autonomy and a theory of general welfare that 
required protecting such liberty. Not only might such principles be 
identified in current views about American legal practices but (more 
importantly for the value of accuracy) might stand as an independent moral 
theory of taxation. Here the correct legal solution would be to strike down 
the statute on the basis that the injustice it would create outweighs all 
countervailing considerations. 
  
If income tax was set at a less obviously wrong level, say 12%, the court 
would have no obvious moral reason to overturn it. Even if the ideal level 
of income tax for promoting liberty and welfare in the U.S.A. is 11.5% the 
Supreme Court might refuse to review the statute on moral grounds, even 
if it had the relevant expertise. It might cite reasons such as upholding the 
separation of powers or the democratic force of the statute.[120] Note 
that political values, such as democracy, are engaged here: the Supreme 
Court is not simply being pragmatic, but is engaging in matters of 
principle. Here the correct moral solution would be to uphold a taxation 
level, which considered in isolation of the legal practices it is implemented 
by, would be less than ideal. 
  
It is of course useful to think of how the problem should be answered if 
the institution applying it didn’t exist. This promotes the very accuracy 
that I have argued is so important to legality. Imagining a world in which 
no one held incorrect moral views and no genuine mistakes were made is 
important for promoting individual justice. However, as our discussion of 
legality indicates, morality is not reducible to the right outcomes to 
particular problems in isolation of their place in a wider social system. In 
order to find out what morality truly requires in a particular case we have 
to take everything into account - including our institutional framework, 
differences in opinion and collective fallibility. Dworkin makes the 
distinction between pure (dealing only with justice) and inclusive (dealing 
with fairness and due process as well) integrity for that reason.[121] For 
him the value of legality is found in inclusive integrity, which requires this 
all-things-considered, practical moral reasoning. This understanding of 
what morality demands is the same for my theory of legality. I maintain 
that sometimes, such as when a statute is passed by a democratic process, 
it is morally required to uphold something that seems to flout justice (in 
the sense that Dworkin defines it).[122] This is because justice so defined, 
is not all there is to morality. 
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So, the short answer to the question of how my theory of legality changes 
legal reasoning is ‘not much’. But this makes sense. After all, I have 
attempted to propose a theory that fits, as well as justifies, current legal 
practice. The difference is one of attitude and degree: we should be 
prepared to defend and question everything on substantive moral grounds. 
We do this to a great extent already. I am merely arguing that it is time to 
acknowledge and exemplify it. 
  
Assuming that my conceptions of legality and moral reasoning are correct, 
then my thesis that (for an interpretivist) legal propositions never conflict 
with what morality demands is also correct. If law requires moral 
justification and moral justification proceeds on the basis of providing the 
best possible answer, then any proposition of law that fails to satisfy that 
standard is false. After all why should we be so modest – sensibly in my 
view – about our ability to discover the best moral answer, and yet so bold 
as to assume that any of our legal propositions are easier to justify? Given 
the total dependence of law on morality, it seems only such self-assurance 
stands in the way of my thesis. Surely that is not reason enough to deny it? 
8. Conclusion 
  
I entitled this essay ‘Expanding Law’s Empire’ because that is exactly what 
I have attempted to do. I have developed an interpretivist theory of 
legality that is not community based but universal and promotes pursuit of 
the perfect legal order. I have attempted throughout to remain true to 
interpretivist methodology whilst arguing for a ‘natural law’ conclusion. 
The notion of law as ‘right reason...[which is] unchanging and everlasting’ 
might seem outmoded but can be amended through the modern school of 
interpretivism to provide a sound justification of legality.[123] This theory 
of legality takes law’s purpose to be providing the correct moral answer to 
a particular problem given a specific set of facts. In many ways, moving 
from Dworkinian interpretivism to natural law interpretivism is a matter 
of degree more than anything else. My arguments have, for the most part, 
constituted a positive moral case for a universalist conception of legality. I 
am not proposing a new theory of analytical jurisprudence, merely 
asserting what I feel to be a better interpretation of legal practice. 
  
As we have seen, legal reasoning so conceived is identical to moral 
reasoning and both reasoning processes demand us to consider the same 
material. It seems logical that if two phenomena (in this case legal 
reasoning and moral reasoning) share identical characteristics, then they 
are the same. We might be ambitious enough to conclude that not only 
does a true legal proposition never conflict and/or depends on the answer 
to an identical moral question, but that they are the same proposition 
metaphysically. [124] I leave open the question of whether this is 
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correct, as practically it doesn’t seem to matter. The results of my 
conclusions are that courts need to take moral arguments more seriously 
and be prepared to question the moral basis of established authorities. It is 
better to realise the gravity of the task facing our judges than to simply 
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